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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court on 
March 14, 2006. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are present in this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing to rule that the McElprangs 
were entitled to a prescriptive easement to use the curved road located through the top of 
the Western Disputed Area to continue to access to the McElprangs' property in light of 
the factual finding that the McElprangs had established all of the elements for a 
prescriptive easement? (Issue preserved: R. 428.) 
Standard of review: The scope of a prescriptive easement "is a question of law, 
which [appellate courts] review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 
312 (Utah 1998). 
2. Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of law that the McElprangs were 
not entitled to a prescriptive easement on the Northern Disputed Area for storing 
machinery, old vehicles, and power poles? (Issue preserved: R. 428.) 
Standard of review: "The finding that an easement exists is a conclusion of law. 
Such a finding is, however, the type of highly fact-dependent question . . . which accords 
the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to 
given set of facts. [A Utah appellate court] therefore overturn[s] the finding of an 
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easement only if [the court] find[s] that the trial judge's decision exceeded the broad 
discretion granted." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311. 
3. Did the trial court err in determining that the McElprangs had failed to establish 
boundary by acquiescence? (Issue preserved: R. 428.) 
Standard of review: An appellate court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a 
trial court sitting without a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." RHN Corp. v. 
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 22, 96 P.3d 935 (further citations omitted). However, a trial 
court's conclusions of law shall be reviewed "on this issue 'for correctness, according the 
trial court no particular deference.'" Id. (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 
(Utah 1998)). 
4. Did the trial court err in determining that there was sufficient evidence to show 
that oral permission by Blake Jones interrupted the twenty year prescriptive period 
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement for storage? (Issue preserved: R. 424, 
428.) 
Standard of review: An appellate court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a 
trial court sitting without a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." RHN Corp., 2004 
UT 60, | 22 (further citations omitted). However, a trial court's conclusions of law shall 
be reviewed "on this issue 'for correctness, according the trial court no particular 
deference.'" Id. (quoting Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed by Lee and Lorie McElprang ("the 
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McElprangs") against Blake and Wilda Jones ("the Joneses") seeking to quiet title to two 
parcels of land. Following a trial, the district court dismissed the McElprangs' boundary 
by acquiescence and prescriptive easement claims and granted judgment in favor of the 
Joneses on their trespass claim. 
II. Proceedings Below 
On May 31, 2000, the McElprangs filed a Complaint with the Seventh District 
Court in Emery County. (See R. 1-11.) The Complaint listed four causes of action: 
(1) boundary by acquiescence; (2) prescriptive easement; (3) estoppel, laches, and 
waiver; and (4) trespass. (Id.) The Joneses filed an Answer and Counterclaim on June 
21, 2000, which included three causes of action: (1) trespass, (2) assault, and 
(3) intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. (R. 15-39.) The McElprangs 
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on June 27, 2002, seeking summary 
judgment on the Joneses' second and third causes of action. (R. 74-90.) The district 
court granted the partial summary judgment and dismissed those two causes of action in 
its October 18, 2002 Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 173-77.) 
Trial was held on June 24-27, 2003, before the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner.1 (R. 434.) 
On January 17, 2006, the district court entered both its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (attached in the Addendum as Tab A) (R. 417-32) and its Judgment. (Attached in 
the Addendum as Tab B) (R. 434-38.) In the Judgment, the court dismissed with 
prejudice the all of the McElprangs' causes of action, and also dismissed with prejudice 
1
 Judge Bryner retired shortly after the judgment was entered in the case. The Honorable 
George M. Harmond presently is the judge assigned to the case. 
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the Joneses' causes of action for assault and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. (R. 434.) The district court did, however, grant judgment in favor of the 
Joneses on their trespass claim against the McElprangs. (R. 434-35.) A Notice of Appeal 
was filed on February 15, 2006, in which the McElprangs gave notice that they intended 
to appeal the Judgment as well as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on which 
the Judgment was based. (R. 473-75.) 
III. Statement of Material Facts2 
The McElprangs and the Joneses are adjoining landowners in Emery County, 
Utah. (R. 419.) The McElprangs purchased their property from Douglas and Lorraine 
Sitterud in 1969, subject to a mortgage in favor of Farmers Home Administration 
("FmHA"). (Id.) The Joneses purchased their property from Fawn McCandless in 1972, 
but had leased the property during the preceding 10 years. (Id.) The two properties at 
issue in this case are adjacent to each other and the legal descriptions do not overlap. 
(Id.) The McElprangs' property is located to the west and north of the Joneses property.4 
(Id.) At issue in this case are two separate areas: the Northern Disputed Area and the 
Western Disputed Area. 
2
 The Statement of Material Facts is based upon the district court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 417-32.) However, some of these facts are disputed for the 
reasons discussed later in this Brief. 
3
 For illustrative purposes, a map of the two properties is attached in the Addendum as 
Tab C and an aerial photograph of the properties is attached in the Addendum as Tab D. 
4
 Although paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact states that the McElprangs' property is 
located to the west of the Joneses' property, the record and the testimony at trial clearly 
evidence that the McElprangs' property is located both north and west of the Joneses' 
property. (R. 419.) 
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A. Western Disputed Area 
The Western Disputed Area ("WDA") is a rectangular portion of property lying to 
the east of the McElprangs' actual property line. It is separated from the rest of the 
Joneses' property by a fence line on the east side of the WD A. Edward Geary, who was a 
prior owner of both properties, installed the fence between 1948 and 1950 to separate his 
non-irrigated land, which was used for a stackyard, from his irrigated crop land. (R. 
420.) When originally constructed, the McElprang and Jones properties were one 
property, and the fence was not intended to serve as a boundary line fence. (Id.) Lee 
McElprang testified that when he and his wife acquired their property in 1969, an FmHA 
representative told them that the fence line was the eastern boundary of their property. 
(R. 422). Based on these representations, the McElprangs always believed that they 
owned up to the fence line and that the fence was jointly owned by both parties; thus, the 
McElprangs recognized and treated the fence as the boundary line between the two 
properties from 1969 forward. (R. 422.) The McElprangs occupied the WD A up to the 
visible fence line by grazing cattle from October to April each year from 1969 until 1999. 
(R. 420.) The McElprangs also raised alfalfa and/or corn on part of the WDA from 1969 
until 1983. (R.421.) 
The McElprangs accessed their property located west of the WDA by using a 
curved road located on the McElprangs property, except for a portion of the road that 
crosses the northern part of the WDA. (R. 421.) The curved road was used openly and 
continuously to access the McElprangs' property prior to the time that they purchased the 
property in 1969. (R. 421.) In 1983, the McElprangs built a silage pit on part of their 
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property that was also accessed using the curved road through the WDA. (R. 421.) 
Although the McElprangs used the WDA for thirty years to graze cattle, raise 
crops, and access their property over the curved road, the district court found that Blake 
Jones ("Blake") never considered the fence to be the boundary between the two 
properties. (R. 422.) In 1983, the Joneses had their property surveyed by Evan Hansen, a 
registered land surveyor, and Mr. Hansen placed rebar stakes in the north and south 
corners of west side of the WDA. (R. 422.) The district court found that Blake had a 
conversation with Lee McElprang ("Lee") in 1983 in which Blake gave Lee permission 
to use the WDA for grazing purposes and to park equipment on, even though Blake was 
unable to remember where the conversation took place, what exactly was said, or the date 
on which the conversation occurred despite repeated questioning. (R. 422.) The district 
court also found that shortly thereafter, Lee plowed a furrow between the north and south 
stakes on the western edge of the WDA and never cultivated the land between the fence 
and the furrow after that date. (R. 422.) The district court did note that Lee, however, 
testified that the 1983 conversation never took place and testified that he was never given 
any permission by the Joneses to use the WDA or the NDA. (R. 423.) 
Additionally, the district court found that in the spring of 1987, Randy Jones 
("Randy") (son of Blake and Wilda Jones) and his father were parked on the county road 
immediately south of the WDA when Lee came driving by. (R. 423.) Randy stated that 
they flagged Lee down and began discussing the 1983 survey when Blake asked Lee 
about the stake at the northwest corner of the WDA that had been placed there by Mr. 
Hansen. (R. 423.) Lee responded that he had pounded the rebar stake into the ground 
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because he had ruptured a tire on it, and he offered to show the Joneses where the stake 
was when they were ready to install a fence. (R. 423.) 
In November of 1999, the McElprangs installed a culvert on the south side of the 
WD A along the county road and built a road northward across the WD A. (R. 422.) That 
same month, the Joneses caused the fence to be torn down for the purpose of constructing 
a building on a portion of the property where the fence was located. (R. 420.) 
B. Northern Disputed Area 
The Northern Disputed Area ("NDA") is a triangular shaped property located within 
the property actually owned by the Joneses south of the McElprangs5 boundary with the 
Joneses. The NDA is bounded on the south by a fence line separating it from the rest of 
the Joneses' property. The McElprangs used the north disputed area up to the fence line 
to store farm machinery, old vehicles, power poles, etc. since 1969. (R. 424.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court incorrectly held that the McElprangs failed to establish their 
claims for boundary by acquiescence and a prescriptive easement. 
First, the district court erred in denying the McElprangs' cause of action for 
prescriptive easement. In its findings, the district court held that the McElprangs had 
established a prescriptive easement across the curved road to access the western portion 
of their property, but stated they did not develop a prescriptive easement across the 
curved road to access their silage pit built in 1983. In the judgment, however, the district 
court completely denied the McElprangs' claim for prescriptive easement. The 
McElprangs have used the curved road across the WDA to access the western portion of 
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their property for agricultural purposes for thirty years. The fact that the silage pit was 
not built until 1983 does not prohibit the McElprangs from using the curved road to 
access the western portion of their property and access the silage pit. The addition of the 
silage pit upon the McElprangs' property did not impermissibly extend the scope of the 
prescriptive easement nor did it increase the burden on the servient estate. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse the district court and require entry of a ruling allowing the 
McElprangs to use the properly established prescriptive easement. 
The district court also erred in holding that Utah law does not allow for a 
prescriptive easement to be established for the purpose of storing personal property on 
the real property of another. Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
prescriptive easement cannot be established to maintain a permanent structure on the land 
of another, the easement sought by the McElprangs would not result in permanent 
exclusive occupancy of the Joneses' property. Thus, this Court should reverse the district 
court and require entry of a ruling granting the McElprangs a prescriptive easement to 
store their personal property on the NDA. 
The district court further erred in holding that the McElprangs failed to establish 
boundary by acquiescence because they failed to establish mutual acquiescence in the 
fence line as a boundary. The district court found that in 1983, Blake Jones gave Lee 
McElprang permission to use the disputed areas. However, after marshaling all of the 
evidence that could support such a finding, it is clear that the finding that permission was 
granted was against the great weight of evidence and was therefore clearly erroneous. 
The district court also found that a 1987 conversation between Blake Jones, Randy Jones, 
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and Lee McElprang reaffirmed that there was not mutual acquiescence. Nevertheless, the 
conversation did not defeat mutual acquiescence because there was no unequivocal 
statement by the Joneses that they did not recognize the fence as the boundary line. 
Finally, the district court found that a line plowed between two survey stakes on the west 
edge of the WDA supported its holding that there was no mutual acquiescence. 
However, whether or not there was a plowed line does not show that there was not 
mutual acquiescence because both parties continued to use up to, and never over, the 
fence line on their respective sides of the fence. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
district court and enter a ruling granting the McElprangs' establishment of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
Finally, the district court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to 
support its finding that oral permission was given by Blake Jones to Lee McElprang, 
thereby interrupting the twenty-year prescriptive period necessary to establish boundary 
by acquiescence and a prescriptive easement. However, after marshaling all of the 
evidence that could support such a finding, it is clear that the finding that permission was 
granted was against the great weight of evidence and was therefore clearly erroneous. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court and enter a ruling granting the 
McElprangs5 claims for boundary by acquiescence and prescriptive easement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE HOLDING THAT THE 
MCELPRANGS DID NOT OBTAIN A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
ACROSS THE WDA ALONG THE CURVED ROAD 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a] prescriptive easement is created when 
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the party claiming the prescriptive easement can prove that 'use of another's land was 
open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years.'" 
Orton, 970 P.2d at 1258 (quoting Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311). The district court found 
that the McElprangs did precisely that. The McElprangs provided sufficient evidence to 
establish each of the elements of a prescriptive easement; thus, the court concluded that 
the McElprangs had established a prescriptive easement as a matter of law to use the 
curved road that crosses the WDA for the purpose of accessing their property.5 (R. 424-
25.) However, the trial court incorrectly ruled that, although the McElprangs had 
established all of the elements for a prescriptive easement to utilize the curved road to 
access the western portion of their land, they were not entitled to a ruling granting them a 
prescriptive easement over the same curved road. Despite finding that the McElprangs 
had established a prescriptive easement over the curved road in the WDA to access their 
property, the trial court completely denied the McElprangs5 claim for a prescriptive 
easement in the Judgment. (R. 434.) 
The finding of an easement is a conclusion of law; however, such a finding is 
highly-fact sensitive, which "accords the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when 
applying the correct legal standard to given set of facts." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311. 
Thus, a Utah appellate court overturns a trial court's finding of an easement only if the 
appellate court finds that "the trial judge's decision exceeded the broad discretion 
5
 While paragraph 25 of the Findings of Fact states that the curved road located at the top 
of the WDA was used by the McElprangs for the purpose of "accessing their property 
that is located to the east of the WDA," in reality, the McElprangs' property is located to 
the west and north of the Joneses' property. (R. 424-25.) 
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granted." Id. 
The district court held that the road had been in use prior to the time that the 
McElprangs purchased the property, and that prior to 1983, the road had been openly and 
continuously used to access the western portion of the land for more than twenty years. 
(R. 421.) Despite this finding the district court did not grant the McElprangs a 
prescriptive easement in its Judgment. The court reasoned that because a silage pit was 
built in 1983, the road had not been used to access the silage pit for a period of twenty 
years. Under the court's reasoning, the McElprangs established an easement to use the 
road to access their land, but lost the easement by building a silage pit built on their land. 
(R. 421, 428.) 
Unlike an express easement, whose permissible uses can usually be ascertained 
from the instrument creating the easement, the permissible uses of a prescriptive 
easement are defined by the extent of use of the easement during the prescriptive period. 
See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312 ("The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive 
easement is measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period."); Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 157 (Utah 1946) ("[T]he extent of 
an easement acquired by prescription is measured and limited by the use made during the 
prescriptive period."). "The ultimate criterion in determining the scope of a prescriptive 
easement is that of avoiding increased burdens upon the servient tenement while allowing 
some flexibility in the use of the dominant tenement." Pipkin v. Torosian, 35 Cal. App. 
3d 722, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (citations omitted). 
The district court made no finding that the construction of the silage pit on the 
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McElprangs' property resulted in a substantial increase in the use of the curved road. 
Indeed, there was no evidence that the use of the curved road substantially changed after 
the installation of the silage pit in 1983. Even Dirk Jones, one of the Joneses' sons and a 
witness called by the Joneses, testified that there was not a substantial increase in the use 
of the road after the silage pit was built. (R. 536; Tr. Vol. Ill, 626:3 to 627:5.) The 
court's ruling that the McElprangs did not establish a prescriptive easement to access 
their silage pit was based solely on the fact that the silage pit was not built until 1983. 
(R. 421, 428.) The fact that the silage pit was not built until 1983 does not, however, cut 
off the McElprangs from using the curved road to enter the western portion of their 
property and access the silage pit. The mere addition of a new use of the McElprangs' 
property accessed via the curved road does not impermissibly extend the scope of the 
prescriptive easement. Many courts have held that "a mere increase in the volume of 
traffic across [an easement] will not constitute a per se overburdening." Gutcheon v. 
Becton, 585 A.2d 818 (Me. 1991); see also Gaither v. Gaither, 332 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1958) ("If the change is not in the kind of use, but merely one of degree 
imposing no greater burden on the servient estate, the right to use the easement is not 
affected."). 
The McElprangs, as well as members of the Jones family and other witnesses, 
testified that the McElprangs and others used the road continuously since even before the 
McElprangs purchased the land to access the western portion of their land for agricultural 
purposes—to cultivate and water the land, plant and harvest crops, move farm equipment, 
check the cattle grazing on the land, and to access the silage pit built in 1983. {See R. 
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535; Tr. Vol. II., 440:5 to 440:11, 451:7 to 451:19; R. 536; Tr. Vol. Ill, 624:25 to 657:5; 
R. 537; Tr. Vol. IV, 911:20 to 912:12.) Thus, the McElprangs used the curved road for 
more than twenty years to access the western portion of their property for agricultural 
purposes. The fact that one additional improvement was built upon the dominant estate 
does not disqualify the McElprangs from holding a prescriptive easement or change the 
"nature, character, and volume" of the McElprangs' use of the curved road during the 
prescriptive period. Pipkin, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 726-27 ("[I]t is the nature, character and 
volume of the usage of the easement during the prescriptive period which determines its 
scope and . . . the use to which the dominant tenement is being put during that period is 
only one factor that may be germane in defining that use."). The district court erred 
when it determined that one additional activity on the McElprangs5 land vitiated their 
prescriptive easement. 
Because the curved road was used by the McElprangs to access their property for 
more than thirty years, the fact that the McElprangs made an additional improvement on 
their own property should not limit the use of the prescriptive easement that the district 
court found had been established on the curved road. See Pipkin , 35 Cal. App. 3d at 728 
(stating that it should "be of no moment" to the owners of the servient estate if the 
owners of the dominant estate are using the easement for the purpose of accessing a 
residential home or for agricultural purposes, "so long as the amount of traffic is not 
substantially increased."); Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312 ("The right cannot be enlarged to 
place a greater burden or servitude on the property." (quotation and citation omitted)); 
Lutheran High School Ass'n v. Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, 2003 UT App 403, f 15, 
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81 P.3d 792 (stating that an overburdening of an express easement by the dominant estate 
"may only occur if use of the easement substantially increases use of the servient estate . . 
. .") As an example, the fact that a farmer used an easement over his neighbor's land to 
access a pasture to feed horses and then some years later place a small barn in the pasture 
to store tack and hay for the horses, using the easement to access the pasture to reach the 
horses and the small barn does not impermissibly expand the scope of the easement or 
overly burden the servient estate. 
The district court properly found that a prescriptive easement had been 
established, but erred in concluding that the easement cannot be used as it has since 1983 
by the McElprangs to access their silage pit and erred in refusing to grant the McElprangs 
a prescriptive easement in the Judgment to the extent it had found one existed. The 
agricultural purpose of using the road to access the McElprangs' western property clearly 
encompassed accessing the silage pit without increasing the scope of the easement or the 
burden on the servient estate. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court and 
require entry of a ruling allowing the McElprangs to use the properly established 
prescriptive easement to the same level as during the prescriptive period in which it was 
established regardless of what the McElprangs do on their own property after using the 
road. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S LEGAL 
CONCLUSION THAT A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CANNOT BE 
ESTABLISHED FOR STORING VEHICLES AND OTHER PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
In its Conclusions of Law, the district court summarily concluded that "under Utah 
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law a Prescriptive Easement cannot be established for the purpose of storage of Personal 
Property on the real property of another." (R. 428.) However, the court offered no 
further authority or explanation of its basis for its assertion. The court erred in 
determining that granting a prescriptive easement to store personal property is not 
allowable or appropriate under Utah law. The finding of an easement is a conclusion of 
law; however, such a finding is highly-fact sensitive, which "accords the trial judge a 
broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to given set of 
facts." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311. Thus, a Utah appellate court overturns a trial court's 
finding of an easement only if the appellate court finds that "the trial judge's decision 
exceeded the broad discretion granted." Id. 
The McElprangs claimed an easement in gross on the NDA for storage of farm 
machinery, vehicles, power poles, and other items as they have been since the late 
1970's. In Utah, an easement which "is not appurtenant to any particular estate is an 
easement in gross." Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984). There is no 
requirement for a dominant and servient estate to establish an easement in gross; 
nevertheless, "an easement in gross can be acquired by prescription." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that granting a prescriptive easement is 
impossible where it would provide for "permanent exclusive occupancy of the fee title 
owner's land." Nyman v. Anchor Development, L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, f 18, 73 P.3d 357. 
In Nyman, Michael Nyman sought a prescriptive easement on a neighbor's land in order 
to continue using part of the neighbor's property as the location of a garage that was built 
partially on the neighboring land. Id. f 17. The Court, however, noted that no prior Utah 
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case had recognized a prescriptive easement "to maintain a permanent structure on 
someone else's property." Id. \ 18. Thus, the Court held that Nyman was not entitled to 
a prescriptive easement because it would "effectively deprive [the neighbor] of all rights 
to which, as record owner, he is entitled." Id. 
Unlike Nyman, in this case the McElprangs do not seek to maintain a permanent 
structure on the NDA; they merely desire to continue to store personal property there. 
None of the uses for which the easement is sought by the McElprangs amount to uses 
providing for permanent exclusive occupancy prohibited in Nyman. Id. The personal 
property that has been stored on the NDA for over twenty years is not affixed to the land. 
Rather it is property that can—and has been—moved to different places, as necessitated 
by the McElprangs' farming operations. Other states have held that prescriptive 
easements can be established for the purpose of parking vehicles. See, e.g., Inch v. 
McPherson, 859 P.2d 755 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming a trial court's judgment 
awarding a prescriptive easement to park cars); Brown v. Sneider, 400 N.E.2d 1322 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (affirming a master's judgment that the defendants acquired a 
prescriptive easement to park vehicles on driveway). Similarly, an easement should be 
granted to the McElprangs to park vehicles and equipment and to store personal property. 
The McElprangs are not attempting to deprive the Joneses of all of their rights associated 
with the NDA; rather, the McElprangs are asking for an easement to allow them to 
continue to park and store personal property on the NDA, just as they have done for 
almost thirty years. 
The district court erred in concluding that under Utah law a prescriptive easement 
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cannot be established to store personal property on the real property of another. Because 
the easement sought by the McElprangs will not result in permanent exclusive occupancy 
of the NDA, Utah law clearly does not prohibit the McElprangs from establishing a 
prescriptive easement to store their personal property on the NDA. Therefore, this Court 
should follow other states and reverse the district court and require entry of a ruling 
granting the McElprangs a prescriptive easement to store their vehicles and personal 
property on the NDA. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE MCELPRANGS 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
The Utah Supreme Court has established four elements that must be met in order 
to establish boundary by acquiescence: "(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by 
monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) 
for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." Orton, 970 P.2d at 1257 
(quoting Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)). The district court found 
that the first, third, and fourth elements were established by the McElprangs at trial. (R. 
428.) However, the court held that the McElprangs failed to establish mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, and therefore ruled that the McElprangs had not 
established boundary by acquiescence. A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed 
"on this issue 'for correctness, according the trial court no particular deference.'" RHN 
Corp., 2004 UT 60, % 22; see also Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, f 8, 136 P.3d 
1252 (stating that a determination of mutual acquiescence "is reviewable as a matter of 
law"). The findings of fact, as they relate to a boundary by acquiescence claim, made by 
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a trial court sitting without a jury will not be reversed by an appellate court "unless they 
are . . . clearly erroneous." RHN Corp., 2004 UT 60, f 22. 
The district court refused to grant the McElprangs' claim for boundary by 
acquiescence because it found that the McElprangs and the Joneses did not mutually 
acquiesce in the fence line as the boundary between their properties for twenty years. 
The court's ruling was based on its finding that Blake Jones verbally gave permission to 
Lee McElprang to use the disputed property in 1983. (R. 422.) As support for the ruling, 
the court noted its findings that Blake Jones and Randy Jones had a discussion with Lee 
McElprang in 1987 in which the Joneses' survey was discussed and that Lee plowed a 
furrow along the western edge of the WDA between two survey stakes. (R. 422-23.) 
However, these findings are insufficient to support the trial court's determination to deny 
the McElprangs' claim for boundary by acquiescence. 
A. Evidence was Insufficient to Support the District Court's Finding that 
the 1983 Conversation Took Place 
McElprangs challenge the trial court's finding that Blake Jones gave permission to 
use the NDA and the WDA in 1983. (R. 422, 424.) This is the sole basis for the district 
court not finding boundary by acquiescence. Normally, trial court's findings are 
reviewed by an appellate court for clear error. "[HJowever, when an appellant challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a court's findings of fact, we require them to 
first 'marshall [sic] the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence.'" In re LM, 2001 UT App 314, H 14, 37 P.3d 118 (quoting 
4819-6420-1729 :MC208-001 18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In re D.G., 938 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). The duty to marshal requires the 
McElprangs to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., SIS P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)). 
In order to comply with their marshaling burden, the McElprangs present the 
following evidence that was presented to the trial court during the course of trial: 
1. On direct examination by Mr. Smith, Blake Jones made the following 
statements: 
Mr. Smith: Now let's go from the period ~ let's - let me, if I can show 
you this right here, during the period that you bought the property in 1972, 
let's talk about 1972 to 1999 for right now, okay? 
Mr. Jones: Okay. 
Mr. Smith: Let's talk about this west disputed property. During that 
whole entire period of time Mr. McElprang was making use of the west 
disputed property right up to the fence line, wasn't he? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: He was keeping his cattle in there during that time wasn't he? 
Mr. Jones: At times, yes. 
Mr. Smith: In fact, he kept them in there every year during that period of 
time, didn't he? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: He didn't pay you anything for that? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Mr. Smith: He didn't ask for permission about that? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. I gave him permission to use that piece any way he 
would like. I didn't have no use for it at the time. 
Mr. Smith: Oh, I see. So you have him the permission from that period 
of time to treat this fence as the boundary during that period of time? 
Mr. Jones: No, I didn't say nothing about the boundary. I gave him 
permission to use that piece of ground, but nothing on boundaries or — 
Mr. Smith: Well, isn't that what you told him to do? If you told him -
you say you told him he could use the property, didn't you tell him he could 
use the property right up to the fence? 
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Ms. White: Objection. That mischaracterizes the statements. The 
witness has answered it. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Smith: When you claim you gave him permission, did you give him 
any kind — anything in writing? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Mr. Smith: So there's no written record of this? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Mr. Smith: Do you remember, was there other people there when you 
gave him this permission ~ supposedly gave him this permission. 
Mr. Jones: No, not that I remember. 
Mr. Smith: Where were you at when you gave this permission to Mr. 
McElprang? 
Mr. Jones: I can't remember. Either out on the property or ~ where we 
were talking, whether we was in the street or — 
Mr. Smith: And what year was it? 
Mr. Jones: Probably from any time after '72. I can't remember the exact 
time. 
Mr. Smith: Do you recall what your words were to Mr. McElprang at that 
time? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Mr. Smith: Do you recall what he said to you? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 164:20 to 166:22.) 
2. A few lines later Mr. Jones made the following statements: 
Mr. Smith: Now you didn't go and tell Mr. McElprang he couldn't use this 
property on the west disputed property any more, did you? 
Mr. Jones: No. I did when he trespassed on it, but that's the first time. 
Mr. Smith: When he trespassed? Well, he was using that this whole 
entire period, wasn't he? 
Mr. Jones: Yes, with my permission. 
Mr. Smith: Well, now you're calling it trespass. How is it a trespass if he 
Mr. Jones: I said in '99 it was a trespass. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 167:4 to 167:14.) 
3. A discussion occurred concerning Mr. Jones taking down the fence 
dividing his property from the Western Disputed Area: 
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Mr. Smith: Okay. You removed the fence. Now if you had given Mr. 
McElprang permission to use all this property, don't you think you should 
have gone to him before you tore down the fence and told him that you're 
revoking that permission? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 170:14 to 170:19.) 
4. During direct examination, Mr. Smith asked Mr. Jones about a letter sent to 
Mr. McElprang by Mr. Joneses' attorney in November 1999. Mr. Smith read a portion of 
the letter to Mr. Jones. 
Mr. Smith: "While Mr. Jones has granted you permission in the past to 
some minor uses to assist you in your day-to-day operations, he has never 
given you permission to enter onto his property, construct roadways, install 
culverts and generally turn his property into a junkyard parking lot." Do 
you see that statement? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: Now do you agree with that statement? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: You do. However, during this whole period of time that 
we're talking about, you just testified Mr. McElprang was parking derelict -
- or was parking equipment in both the west and north disputed areas; isn't 
that right? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: Now did he have your permission to do that or not? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: Well, Mr. Jones, you just told me that he didn't have your 
permission to do that. Which is it? 
Ms. White: Your Honor, I object. He's laid no foundation, so he hasn't 
established what happened at the time of the letter to change things. So by 
laying no foundation - -
The Court: Well, overruled. You can get into that on cross. 
Mr. Smith: So Mr. Jones, which is it? Did you grant Mr. McElprang 
permission to park his equipment on the north and west disputed areas or 
not? 
Mr. Jones: Have you got a time element there when -
Mr. Smith: From the period of 1972 until this letter came out in 1999 
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Mr. Jones: He had permission to park stuff on my property. 
Mr. Smith: Okay. So this letter is incorrect, then? 
Mr. Jones: Well, I'm misunderstanding, I guess. (Witness reads letter). 
That is a different meaning to me. To enter into this property and to 
construct roadways, install culverts and generally turn his property into a 
junkyard. I certainly did not give him permission to do that. 
Mr. Smith: Well -
Mr. Jones: If that's what you're asking now. Is that clear? 
Mr. Smith: So what permission did you give Mr. McElprang? 
Mr. Jones: To use that piece of property to run his cows on, what he 
needed. I didn't object to any of it because I didn't need it. 
Mr. Smith: How about parking equipment on the property? 
Mr. Jones: I had no objection. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. 1, 182:19 to 184:19.) 
6. Still in Mr. Joneses' direct testimony: 
Mr. Smith: Now mr. [sic] McElprang has testified that you never gave 
him ever any permission to use either the north or the west disputed areas. 
You heard that testimony? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: And you can't come up with anything in writing or any 
witnesses to your claim that you gave him that permission, can you? 
Ms. White: To use Counsel's objection, you mean beyond his own sworn 
testimony any other evidence? 
The Court: Sustained. That needs to be clarified. 
Mr. Smith: Okay. So other than your say so, that's the only evidence that 
you have of that conversation occurring? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: You can't tell us when that conversation occurred? 
Mr. Jones: Not the exact minute, no. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 193:17 to 194:7.) 
7. Still in Mr. Joneses' direct testimony: 
Mr. Smith: Doesn't it seem odd to you, Mr. Jones, that you would grant 
him permission to use property of yours when you weren't friends of his? 
Mr. Jones: We were friends as far as I was concerned at that time. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 195:11 to 195:15.) 
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8. Further in Mr. Joneses' direct testimony. 
Mr. Smith: I guess I'm having a little bit of a problem in differentiating in 
my mind permission to use the property and saying you didn't believe that 
this was the boundary between your properties, this fence line right here. 
Mr. Jones: I knew it wasn't the boundary. 
Mr. Smith: But you let it be treated in every aspect as the boundary, 
didn't you? 
Ms. White: Objection, that calls for legal conclusion about whether or not 
he allowed everything in every aspect to be treated. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Smith: Well, you allowed Mr. McElprang to graze right up to the 
fence with his cattle, right? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Mr. Smith: You allowed Mr. McElprang to store equipment right up to 
that fence line, correct? 
Ms. White: Objection, your Honor, he's testified he granted permission 
for what was done. That wasn't storing anything right up to the fence line. 
He's allowed the items to be parked that were testified to by the parties. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Smith: You allowed him to store equipment right up to the fence 
line, correct? 
Mr. Jones: The west or the north fence? 
Mr. Smith: Let's start with the west fence. 
Mr. Jones: No, he didn't store any equipment down on — along the north 
fence below the feed yard, no. 
Mr. Smith: How about the equipment stored in this area here? 
Mr. Jones: Very little. That old truck had been there, and there's a — 
some — a few pieces up around there, but it wasn't anything because he was 
farming that down there. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 196:4 to 197:9) 
9. On "cross" by his counsel, Mr. Jones made the following statements. 
Ms. White: Do you remember what, if anything, occurred that made you 
withdraw your permission for Mr. McElprang to continue to have some use 
of your property? Just answer yes or no. Do you remember an event 
occurring? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Okay. Can you tell me when that event occurred? 
Mr. Jones: In 1999. 
4819-6420-1729:MC208-001 23 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 231:11 to 231:18.) 
10. Later on in "cross" examination, Mr. Jones made the following statements: 
Ms. White: Counsel has asked you if you recall where it was that you had 
conversations about giving him permission to do this or to do that on the 
property. 
Mr. Jones: Yes, we did talk about that in the bath house. 
Ms. White: Okay. Tell us what a bath house is. 
Mr. Jones: That's down at the bottom of the — down the processing plant 
of the mine, and that's where you change clothes and then go into the mine 
to work. We were - I talked to him about that, and we also talked about 
me getting that piece of property, exiting the city, you know. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 242:4 to 242:13.) 
11. Further on in this line of questioning. 
Ms. White: Counsel asked you if you remembered any specific 
conversations on permission that you had granted Mr. McElprang. Are you 
able to pin down any particular conversation out of the ones you've just 
been describing in which you gave him any specific permission to park a 
tractor or a truck? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Ms. White: Were there such conversations. 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
Ms. White: Is it just possible for you to pin it down: 
Mr. Jones: No, I can't say a certain time or anything. 
(R. 534, Tr. Vol. I, 244:5 to 244:15.) 
12. On redirect conducted by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones made the following 
statements: 
Mr. Smith: So you've always been in a dispute with McElprangs, haven't 
you? 
Mr. Jones: Not that would affect our relationship. We - I've given him 
permission to do things on my place, I'd use his machinery and so on, and 
we had a good relationship at that time. 
(R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 271:10 to 271:15.) 
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13. Later, in redirect by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones provided the following 
testimony: 
Mr. Smith: Well, there was no reason for you to ever give Mr. 
McElprang permission to do anything because you weren't friends, you 
didn't like each other, you felt threatened by him. 
Mr. Jones: I gave him permission many times. I gave him permission to 
put a water line through one of my farms completely through it. 
Mr. Smith: You never gave him permission to use this property. 
Mr. Jones: I sure did. 
Mr. Smith: The disputed western property. 
Mr. Jones: My property. 
Mr. Smith: But you can't tell us when it was you gave him that 
permission. 
Mr. Jones: It was after '72 and in that area all the way through. He knew 
he could use that property. 
Mr. Smith: And he had been using it when you came onto the property? 
When you bough your property in '72 he was already using it. 
Ms. White: Objection, immaterial. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Smith: When you came onto the property — when you bought your 
property in '72 Mr. McElprang was already using what we've classified 
today as the western disputed area and the northern disputed area, wasn't 
he? 
Mr. Jones: Yes. 
(R. 534, Tr. Vol. I, 275:16 to 276:15.) 
14. In redirect, Mr. Jones also made the following statements: 
Mr. Smith: And he never asked you for any permission to use the 
property in the disputed west area and disputed north area, did he? 
Mr. Jones: I gave him — 
Ms. White: Objection asked and answered. 
Mr. Jones: - - permission. I don't know whether he asked. 
The Court: Sustained. 
(R. 535; Vol. II, 286:4 to 286:11.) 
15. Finally, Mr. Jones was recalled at the end of the trial. On cross examination 
by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones testified as follows: 
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Mr. Smith: Okay. Do you remember on the first time you testified you 
were talking about the McElprangs and you giving them permission to use 
this west disputed area, and I think your words were, as I recall, "I wasn't 
using it so I told them they could go ahead and use this west disputed 
area?" 
Mr. Jones: I don't remember that, no. 
Mr. Smith: You don't remember that testimony? 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Mr. Smith: I think that was Tuesday of trial. Would that be your 
testimony today? 
Mr. Jones: I — 
Ms. White: I'm going to object, your Honor. I don't even know what that 
question means. What would be his testimony. 
Mr. Smith: Let me ask the question this way. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Smith: I'll withdraw. Thank you, your Honor. 
Mr. Smith: Is your testimony today that you weren't making any use of 
the west disputed area so you allowed the McElprangs to come on and 
make use of that property. 
Mr. Jones: No. 
Ms. White: Objection. I was going to object it was asked and answered. 
Mr. Smith: I'm seeing if he — he didn't remember the answer, your 
Honor, so I'm just seeing if he's changing his testimony from Tuesday. 
The Court: Yeah. Overruled. Overruled. 
Mr. Smith: So today your answer would be no to that question? 
Mr. Jones: Ask me the question again. 
Mr. Smith: The question is this. Today would your answer be that you 
gave the McElprangs permission to use this west disputed area because ~ 
and this nor the disputed area because quote "I wasn't making any use of it. 
I didn't need it?" 
Mr. Jones: I didn't make that quote that I wasn't using it. 
(R. 537; Tr. Vol. IV, 814:9 to 815:18.) 
To interrupt the twenty year period for establishment of a prescriptive easement 
and boundary by acquiescence in the twenty seven years between 1972 and 1999, the 
conversation testified to by Blake Jones must have taken place before 1992. In Ault v. 
Holden, 2002 UT 33, % 21, 44 P.3d 781, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the lack 
of mutual acquiescence could be evidenced by mere conversations. However, such 
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conversations must "unequivocally" inform the other property owner that the record 
owner does not recognize the fence line as the boundary between the adjoining 
properties. See id. While a mere conversation may be sufficient to evidence a dispute, 
mere allegation that conversation took place, without more, should certainly not be 
sufficient to refute the allegation that the parties mutually acquiesced in a fence line as 
the boundary between their properties. 
The testimony of Blake Jones was insufficient to allow the trial court to find that 
"[Blake] had a conversation with Plaintiff Lee McElprang in 1983 in which he gave Lee 
permission to use the disputed property for grazing purposes and to park equipment on 
it." (R. 422.) Most curious is the court's finding that the conversation took place in 
1983. This finding clearly goes against the clear weight of evidence because Blake never 
testified that the conversation took place in 1983. See In re L.M., 2001 UT App 314, \ 14 
(stating that a trial court's findings of fact are reversed by an appellate court "where [a] 
finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." (quotation and citation omitted)). Blake 
repeatedly testified that he could not remember when the conversation took place, only 
that it occurred "[pjrobably from any time after '72", (R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 166:16), which 
was the year that Blake acquired his property. Thus, according to Blake's own 
testimony, the conversation (if it occurred at all) could have taken place anytime between 
1972 and 1999. The district court's finding that the permission was granted in 1983 is 
therefore "so lacking in support" that it is "clearly erroneous." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 
312. On the other hand, the district court specifically found that Lee McElprang testified 
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that he never received permission and that this conversation never occurred. (R. 423.) 
The court itself noted that Blake's testimony was lacking by stating that "Blake 
cannot remember where the conversation took place, or what exactly was said, or the date 
on which the conversation occurred." (R. 422.) Clearly, Blake's testimony lacked the 
foundation and credibility to allow the court to find that such a conversation had 
occurred. A finding of fact so detrimental to the McElprangs' causes of action should not 
be based on such deficient testimony. Lee McElprang testified that Blake never gave him 
permission to use either of the disputed areas, (R. 534; Tr. Vol. I, 50:7 to 50:21), and this 
testimony should not have been overcome by the vague, inconsistent, incomplete, and 
unsubstantiated testimony of Blake. Indeed, it is troubling that even after the 
conversation took place, no further action was taken by the Joneses to support the fact 
that this alleged conversation took place until 1999. Because Blake's testimony is 
insufficient to support the district court's finding that Blake gave Lee permission to use 
the disputed areas during a conversation in 1983, the McElprangs ask this Court to find 
that the district court's findings were "against the clear weight of the evidence" and 
therefore "clearly erroneous." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312. 
B. The 1987 Conversation Was Not Sufficient to Show that the Joneses 
Did Not Recognize the Fence as the Boundary Line 
The district court also found that a 1987 conversation involving Lee McElprang, 
Randy Jones, and Blake Jones "reaffirmed" that the McElprangs knew that the Joneses 
did not acquiesce in the fence as the boundary. (R. 423.) However, the testimony 
relating to the conversation by Randy (R. 536; Tr. Vol. Ill, 659:8 to 663:21) and Blake 
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(R. 536; Tr. Vol. Ill, 722:22 to 725:22) does not show that a statement was made to Lee 
that the Joneses did not accept the fence as a boundary. The Joneses testified that they 
discussed the location of a rebar stake apparently used to mark the 1983 survey. Lee told 
them that he had pounded into the ground because he had ruptured a tire on it, but that he 
could show them where it was located. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "mere conversations between the parties 
evidencing either an ongoing dispute as to the property line or an unwillingness by one of 
the adjoining landowners to accept the line as the boundary" can show that the parties did 
not mutually acquiesce in the visible line as the property boundary. Ault v. Holden, 2002 
UT 33, If 21, 44 P.3d 781 The Court further specified that "conversations in which a 
record owner unequivocally informs the other that he owns beyond the 'visible line' 
claimed as a boundary, and that the owner does not recognize that line as separating the 
properties" show that there was not mutual acquiescence. Id. However, the substance of 
the conversation, as related by Blake and Randy Jones, does not establish that the Joneses 
represented to Lee that they did not acquiesce in the fence as the boundary line. There 
was no unequivocal statement that the fence was not the boundary or that the Joneses did 
not recognize the fence as the boundary line between the two properties. 
Furthermore, any knowledge that the Joneses may have had of the surveyed 
boundary does not defeat boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiescence is still 
found where the parties treat a visible boundary as the property line, "regardless of 
whether the landowner knows where the actual boundary lies . . . ." Id. \ 19. Thus, even 
if the Joneses or the McElprangs knew, based on the 1983 survey, that the fence line was 
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not the actual boundary line, this knowledge does not defeat the mutual acquiescence 
element unless the Joneses show that they unequivocally informed the McElprangs that 
they did not acquiesce in the fence as the boundary line. Although the Joneses may have 
had knowledge of the true boundary line, the 1987 discussion regarding a rebar survey 
marker was not sufficient to defeat the McElprangs' boundary by acquiescence claim. 
C. The Finding that the McElprangs Plowed a Line Between the Survey 
Stakes Fails to Show that There Was Not Mutual Acquiescence 
As further support for its holding that the Joneses did not acquiesce in the fence as 
the boundary line, the district court found that in 1983 Lee plowed a furrow between the 
north and south survey stakes on the western edge of the WD A, and that the McElprangs 
never cultivated the land between the fence and the furrow after that date. (R. 422.) 
Even assuming that this finding is correct, it fails to show that the Joneses did not 
acquiesce in the fence as the boundary line. Whether or not there was a plowed line does 
not change the fact that both parties continued to use up to the fence line. Even after the 
line was plowed, the McElprangs continued to use the WDA to graze cattle each winter 
and to access their property via the curved road. (R. 421.) As the Utah Supreme Court 
has noted, acquiescence can be inferred from the actions of the landowners. Ault, 2002 
UT 33, f 19. Thus, because the McElprangs continued to use the WDA up to the fence 
line on the west side of the fence and the Joneses continued to use their land only up to 
the fence line on the east side of the fence, the parties' conduct shows that the partied 
continued to mutually acquiesce to the fence line as the boundary line. See RHN Corp,, 
2004 UT 60, K 25 ("Occupation up to, but never over, the line is evidence of 
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acquiescence."). 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the McElprangs had not 
established boundary by acquiescence. As the evidence presented to the district court 
was insufficient to show that the McElprangs occupied the WDA and NDA by 
permission, the district court should not have found that the disputed areas were used by 
permission since 1983. Instead, there is only the McElprangs5 testimony that the parties 
acquiesced in the fence line as the boundary. Therefore, the district court's ruling on the 
boundary by acquiescence claim should be reversed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT ORAL PERMISSION WAS 
GIVEN BY BLAKE JONES, THEREBY INTERRUPTING THE 
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD NECESSARY TO A PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT 
This Court should hold that the district court's finding that Blake Jones gave oral 
permission to Lee McElprang to use the disputed areas was in clear error. Based on this 
finding, the district court held that the twenty-year period necessary to establish a 
prescriptive easement to use the NDA for storage was interrupted. The trial court found 
that the McElprangs were not entitled to a prescriptive easement for storing machinery, 
old vehicles, power poles, etc. (R. 424.) An appellate court "will not reverse the findings 
of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous." RHN 
Corp, 2004 UT 60, f 22 (further citations omitted). However, a trial court's conclusions 
of law shall be reviewed "on this issue 'for correctness, according the trial court no 
particular deference."' Id. (quoting Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256). 
As explained above in Section III.A, the finding of fact regarding the 1983 
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conversation where permission was allegedly granted was against the great weight of 
evidence and was therefore clearly erroneous. 
Although Section III.A discussed the district courts error as it related to the 
McElprangs' boundary by acquiescence claim, the error is exacerbated in the context of a 
prescriptive easement. It is a well-established rule in Utah that 
once a claimant has shown an open and continuous use of the land under 
claim of right for the twenty-year prescriptive period, the use will be 
presumed to have been adverse. To prevent the prescriptive easement from 
arising, the owner of the servient estate then has the burden of establishing 
that the use was initially permissive. 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311-12; see also Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966); 
Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1946). Once the McElprangs showed that 
they openly and continuously used the NDA for a twenty-year period, the burden of proof 
was upon the Joneses to show that the use was permissive. The district found that the 
Joneses met their burden by showing that the McElprangs use of the disputed areas was 
permissive. (See R. 424.) In reality, the Joneses failed to carry this burden of proof. 
Blake Jones's inconsistent, unclear, incomplete, and unsubstantiated testimony regarding 
the alleged conversation where he granted the McElprangs permission to use the disputed 
areas was insufficient to meet the Joneses' burden of establishing that the use was 
"initially permissive." Testimony about a conversation that is without information about 
where the conversation occurred, who was present, what was said in the conversation, or 
what year the conversation took place is not testimony that carries a burden of proof. 
Therefore, the district court erred when it concluded that the alleged 1983 conversation 
vitiated the element of adverse use in the McElprangs' prescriptive easement claim on the 
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NDA. {See R. 424.) 
CONCLUSION 
The district court incorrectly concluded, after finding that a prescriptive easement 
existed, that the McElprangs could not use that prescriptive easement to access the silage 
pit on their property. The district court also erred in concluding that a prescriptive 
easement could not be created for the storage of equipment. In addition, the district court 
erred in finding that the McElprangs had not established boundary by acquiescence, as 
the evidence in support of its findings of permissive use since 1983 was not supported by 
trial testimony. Finally, the district court erred by determining that the McElprangs could 
not establish a prescriptive easement in the Northern Disputed Area. Therefore, the 
McElprangs respectfully request that this court reverse the trial court on these issues and 
direct entry of judgment in favor of the McElprangs. 
Dated this 22" day of July, 2006, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
J. Crajj?1Smith 
)hexPfeston 
Attorneys for Lee and Lorie McElprang 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the CJQ day of July, 2006, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLANTS was mailed, first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Joane Pappas White 
475 East Main Street #1 
Price, Utah 84501 
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J. Craig Smith (4143) 
R. Christopher Preston (9195) 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE JONES and WILDA JONES, 
Counterclaimants, ] 
LEE MCELPRANG and, ; 
LORIE MCELPRANG, ; 
Counterdefendants. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Case No. 0007000105 
) Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for bench trial to the Court on June 24-27, 2003. 
The Court heard the sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses, received exhibits into evidence 
and took the matter under advisement pending the filing of written closing arguments. The Court, 
having considered the evidence presented, the written closing arguments and the law now enters the 
following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. For purposes of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, the Court 
will refer to the Plaintiffs as the "McElprangs" and to Plaintiff Lee McElprang as '"Lee". The 
FILTD 
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Court will refer to the Defendants as "Joneses" and to Defendant Blake Jones as "Blake". Other witnesses 
may be referred to by their first name only if they have been given sufficient identification. 
2. The Court will use the abbreviation "WDAf when it is referring to the western 
disputed area and will refer to the northern disputed area as "NDA". 
3. Before addressing the specific findings in this case, the Court provides the 
following overview of the actions taken prior to and during the trial in this matter: 
A. Plaintiffs' Complaint asserted Causes of action for (1) boundary by 
acquiescence, (2) prescriptive easement,(3) estoppel waiver, and laches; and (4) trespass. 
The Plaintiffs requested the Court to quiet title in the Plaintiffs' to the WDA and the NDA. 
[In the alternative, they are asking that the Court grant the Plaintiffs a judgment creating] an 
easement in gross on and across the disputed areas for access, storage and agricultural uses. The 
Plaintiffs also requested an Order requiring the Defendants to rebuild a fence that was removed and 
pay for half of its upkeep as well as granting an injunction preventing the Defendants from future 
removal of the fence once the fence has been restored to its historic location. 
B. The Defendants filed a Counter Claim which alleged Causes of Action for (1) 
trespass, (2) assault and (3) intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. In a Ruling on Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment dated October 18, 2002, the Court dismissed the Defendants' 
Causes of Action for assault and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
Defendants' claim for trespass sought money judgment for injuries: to Defendants' land as 
outlined more fully in paragraph 15 of Defendants' Counter Claim 
C. At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' Case in Chief, the Defendants made 
Motions to Dismiss certain of the Plaintiffs' Causes of Action. The Court issued the 
following rulings: 
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1. The Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for 
boundary by acquiescence on the NDA. 
2. The Court denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Cause of Action for 
a prescriptive easement on the NDA. 
3. The Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Cause of Action 
for boundary by acquiescence on the WDA. 
4. The Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claim for 
prescriptive easement on the WDA as to farming, but denied the Motion to 
Dismiss the claim for prescriptive easement as to that portion of the curved 
road at the top of the WDA. 
5. The Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Cause of Action 
regarding estoppel, waiver and laches. 
6. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss the Cause of Action for 
trespass. 
D. After addressing those issues which were dismissed before the 
conclusion of the trial, the Court now addresses those issues which still require 
resolution. 
4. The parties are adjoining land owners in Emery County, Utah. The Plaintiffs 
purchased their property from DOUGLAS 0. SITTERUD and LORRAINE SITTERUD on June 
30, 1969, subject to a mortgage in favor of the FHA. The Defendants purchased their property 
from FAWN MCCANDLLESS in 1972 but leased the property during the preceding 10 
years. The two properties are adjacent to each other and the legal descriptions do not overlap. The 
Plaintiffs' property is located to the west of the Defendants' property. 
4 
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5. The fence (hereinafter called "the fence"), which is the subject of this lawsuit, 
is located entirely on land on which the Defendants are the record owners. The fence runs in an 
east/west direction and was built between 1948 and 1950 by ED GEARY and TED MCCANDLESS 
for the sole purpose of dividing EDWARD GEARYs non-irrigated land, which was used as a 
stackyard, from his irrigated crop land. When constructed it was not intended to serve as a 
boundary line fence. 
6. On or about November 13, 1999, the Defendants caused the fence to be torn 
down for the purpose of constructing a building on a portion of the property where the fence 
was located. No prior notice of the removal of the fence was given to the Plaintiffs. 
7. The Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in this matter on May 31,2000. 
8. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges boundary by acquiescence as one of their Causes 
of Action. If the Plaintiffs fail to establish any one of the elements of the doctrine of the boundary by 
acquiescence, the boundary is defeated. In Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 
1981), the four elements of boundary by acquiescence are as follows: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings; 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
3. For a long period of time; 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
The Court will address each of these elements. 
9. In addressing the element of occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or 
building, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs occupied the WDA up to the visible fence by grazing 
cattle from October through April each year from 1969 until November 14, 1999 when the fence was 
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removed by the Defendants. The Defendant BLAKE JONES also testified that the Plaintiffs used 
the WD A each year up to the visible fence line from 1972 to 1999 for grazing purposes but testified 
that from 1983 forward the number of cattle grazing in that area, was minimal and not 60 to 70 
head of cattle as testified to by the Plaintiffs. From the testimony of the various witnesses, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs occupied the WDA up to the visible fence line for grazing purposes 
from October through April each year from 1969 until November 14, 1999, which is a period in 
excess of twenty years. 
10. The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs raised either alfalfa or corn, or both, on 
the bottom portion of the WLA, up to the visible fence line each year between 1969 and 1983. The 
Plaintiffs ceased cultivation of the WDA in 1983. 
11. The court finds that the plaintiffs developed a prescriptive easement to use the 
curved road at the top of the WDA for the purpose of accessing their property located to the east 
of the WDA. The court finds that the road had been used openly, continuously, adversely and 
under a claim of right for a period in excess of 20 years for access to the plaintiffs' property 
prior to the time the plaintiffs purchased the property in 1969, and that the road was used for 
said purpose for a period in excess of 20 years prior to 1983. 
The plaintiffs did not develop or perfect a prescriptive easement on the said road for the 
purpose of accessing the sileage pit because the evidence shows that the pit was built in 1983, 
and the road was therefore not used for that purpose for a period of over twenty years. 
12. In addressing the element of mutual acquiescence in the line as aboundary, the Court 
finds that in order to prevail on this requirement, the Plaintiffs must establish that the parties 
recognized and treated the fence line as the boundary dividing the Defendants' property from the 
Plaintiffs' property. 
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13. LEE MCELPRANG testified that at the time the Plaintiffs purchased their 
property in 1969, a Mr. HARWARD of the FHA told the Plaintiffs that the fence line was the 
eastern boundary of their property. As a result, the MCELPRANG's always thought they owned 
the WDA up to the fence line and thought that the fence was jointly owned by the parties. The 
Plaintiffs have never plotted their legal description nor have they ever had their property surveyed. 
The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiffs, although they did now know where their eastern 
boundary actually was, acquiesced in the fence line as the eastern boundary of their property. 
The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs recognized and treated the fence as the boundary dividing 
the Defendants' property from the Plaintiffs' property. 
14. The Defendants had their property surveyed in 1583 by EVAN HANSEN, a 
registered land surveyor. MR. HANSEN placed stakes on the north and south corners of the west 
side of the WDA and at other points other than the WDA. BLAKE JONES testified that he never 
considered the fence to be the boundary between the adjacent properties. 
15. BLAKE also testified that he had a conversation with Plaintiff LEE MCELPRANG in 
1983 in which he gave LEE permission to use the disputed property for grazing purposes and to park 
equipment on it. BLAKE cannot remember where the conversation took place, or what exactly 
was said, or the date on which the conversation occurred. BLAKE further testified that shortly 
thereafter LEE plowed a furrow between the hart, and south stakes on the western edge of the 
WDA that was 4 to 6 inches deep and 1 to 2 feet wide. The MCELPRANGS never cultivated 
the land between the fence and the furrow after that date. 
16. BLAKE further testified that in November of 1999, he revoked the permission 
for Plaintiffs to use the land in November because the Plaintiffs removed a culvert on the South 
side of the WDA along the country road and bulldozed a road northward across the WDA. 
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17. LEE denies that the 1983 conversation Over took place and testified 
that he was never given any permission by the Defendants to use the WDA. 
18. RANALL ERNEST JONES, a son of the Defendants, testified that he was 
present at a conversation that occurred in the spring of 1987 on the county road immediately south f the 
WDA. He stated that he and his father were parked on the road when LEE cam driving by. 
They flagged him down and began discussing the 1983 survey when BLAKE asked LEE about 
the stake at the northwest corner of the WDA which had been placed there by surveyor EVAN 
HANSEN. LEE responded that he had pounded the rebar stake into the ground because he 
ruptured a tire on it. He offered to show RANDALL and BLAKE where the stake was when 
they were ready to install the fence on the property boundary. RANDALL also testified that 
following the 1983 conversation he saw the plowed line between the two stakes on the western edge 
of the WDA. RANDALL testified that the Plaintiffs did not cultivate the WDA after that line 
was drawn, 
19. From the evidence presented, the Court finds (]) the Defendants did not 
acquiesce in the fence as the boundary between the adjacent properties. The Court further finds the 
Plaintiffs acquiesced in the fence as the boundary between the two properties only between 1969 up 
until the spring on 1983 when LEE had the conversation with BLAKE resulting in LEE plowing 
a line between the two stakes. The Court finds that the 1987 conversation on the county road reaflBrmed the 
Plaintiffs': knowledge that the two stakes marked the boundary between the properties because LEE 
stated that he could show BLAKE and RANDALL where the northern stake was located "when 
they were ready to fence the property". 
20. In addressing the element that the acquiescence must be for a long period of time, 
the Court finds that the period of acquiescence by the Defendants in treating the fence as a 
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boundary line was only for the period from 1969 through the spring of 1983, which is a period of 
less than twenty years and is, therefore, not Aa long period of time". 
21. In addressing the element that the land must be between adjoining landowners, 
the Court finds that the parties are adjoining landowners with respect to the disputed properties. 
22. Because the Court has found that the parties did not mutually acquiesce in the 
fence line as the boundary between the parties for a period of at least twenty (20) years, the Court 
finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish boundary by acquiescence. Moreover, the 
Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' occupation of the WDA was by permission granted by BLAKE 
JONES in 1983. 
23. Plaintiffs allege as an additional Cause of Action that a prescriptive easement was 
created in their favor across Defendant's land. A prescriptive easement is created when the party 
claiming the prescriptive easement can prove that the use of another's land was (1) open, (2) continuous, (3) 
adverse, and (4) under a claim of right for a period of twenty (20) years. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 
1254,1258 (Utah 1998). 
24. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' use of the NDA was permissive as a result of 
the 1983 conversation between LEE and BLAKE, and the permissive use vitiates the element of 
"adverse use". Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' use of the NDA for storing machinery, old vehicles, 
power poles, etc. was permissive and was not adverse as to the Defendants. Plaintiffs have, therefore, 
not established a prescriptive easement on the NDA. Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that an 
easement can be created on another's land for the purpose of storing junk autos, power poles, 
etc. 
25. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have developed prescriptive easement to use the 
curved road which is located at the top of the WDA for the purpose of accessing their properly that is 
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located to the east of the WDA. The Court finds that said road has been used for access to the 
property owned by the Plaintiffs prior even to the time the Plaintiffs purchased the property in 1969. 
That road has been used for purposes of access to those eastern fields for a period in excess of 
twenty (20) years prior to 1983. However, the Plaintiff did not develop a prescriptive easement on 
said road for the purpose of accessing the silage pit because the evidence shows that the silage pit was 
not built until 1983 and, the road was therefore not prescriptively used for the purpose of accessing a 
silage pit for a period of over twenty years. 
26. With respect to Plaintiffs' claim for trespass, because the Court has found that the 
Plaintiffs were occupying the Defendants' land by verbal permission, the permission could be 
revoked at any time. The Court finds that the Defendants revoked that permission on the date they 
removed the fence, namely, November 13,1999. Plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain an action for 
trespass as they occupied the property at the will of the Defendants. 
27. With respect to Defendant's Counter Claim for trespass, the Court finds that in 
November, 1999, the Plaintiffs entered into and upon the Defendants' property and installed a culvert at 
the bottom end of the WDA, destroyed the Defendants' fence, and bulldozed a dozer-blade width road 
northward across the WDA, all without the permission of the Defendants. The Court therefore 
finds that the Plaintiffs have committed a trespass. 
28. During trial, a stipulation was entered into by the parties which provided that in 
the event the Court found that the Plaintiffs had committed a trespass, then such trespass could 
be remedied as follow: 
A. The parties' attorneys shall select a neutral third person to review and 
evaluate the restoration of Defendants' property in the WDPand the NDP to its 
original condition prior to November 1999. 
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B. Counsel for the parties, no later than March 1, 2006, shall select (1) a 
date for Lee McElprang to begin the restoration described below, (2) a date for 
the restoration date to be completed, and (3) a date by which all the junk and 
personal property shall be removed from the NDA and the WDA. Counsel of the 
parties shall inform the Court of these dates by filing a written stipulation. The 
Jones property shall be restored to its original condition prior to November 1999 
trespass as follows: 
1. Lee McElprang shall remove all personal property and 
junk of any kind whatsoever from both the NDA and the WDA . 
2. Lee McElprang shall remove the culvert he caused to 
be installed in the ditch/canal located on the south end of the WDA; 
3. Lee McElprang shall remove the road which he caused 
to be created from the culvert across the WDA to his property and he 
shall restore the land under same to its original condition prior to 
November 1999. 
4. Lee McElprang shall restore the fence to its condition 
prior to November 1999; 
C. Upon completion of the restoration by the McElprangs, the neutral third 
party shall inspect the restoration and either approve same or reject same as 
being a reasonable restoration. If the restoration is approved, then Plaintiffs 
shall be entitled to an entry of a Satisfaction of Judgment in this matter. If 
the restoration is not approved, then Plaintiffs shall hive 10 days to bring the 
restoration up to standard or the agreement shall be cancelled and one of 
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the commercial contractors, namely Minchey Construction or Scamp 
Excavation, shall be brought in to finish the work and judgment for the 
reasonable costs of their work shall enter in favor of the Defendants and 
against the Plaintiffs herein. 
29. The Court finds that said stipulation is fair and reasonable and 
approves and adopts same herein. In the event that the parties are unable to implement 
the Stipulation or require additional enforcement, then the Court reserves jurisdiction 
to enter additional orders concerning same. 
30. The Court initially awarded the Defendants their attorney's fees 
because the Defendants had prevailed in the case. Following a review of Plaintiffs' 
objection to the award of attorney's fees, the Court has determined that said award was 
not proper. In civil actions, the Court may award attorney's fees only when there is 
either a contractual agreement to pay same or a statute that provides for attorney's fees. There 
was not contract in the current matter. The Court is also persuaded that there was not bad faith 
on the part of the Plaintiffs with respect to the filing of this action and, therefore, there is no 
statutory provision that would justify an award of Defendants' attorney's fees. 
31. With respect to Defendants' costs, however, the Court finds that the 
Defendants are the prevailing party regarding Plaintiffs claims and they are entitled to an award 
of their costs. The Court has stricken the Affidavit of Costs and Attorney's Fees filed by Attorney 
White and the Amended Affidavit but grated leave for her to file same upon completion of the 
judgment in this matter. The Court finds that the award of costs and the itemization for 
same are premature until they are properly submitted as directed by Rule 54 (d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Proceedure. 
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32. With respect to Plaintiffs' costs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are the 
prevailing party regarding Defendants' counterclaims for assault and 
intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs established the first third and fourth 
elements of Boundary by Acquiescence as set forth in the Findings of Fact. However, the 
plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to the second element of 
boundary by acquiescence as set forth in the Findings of Fact 
2. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to establish a Prescriptive Easement for 
the NDA due to Ihe permission which was granted by Blake for such use in 1983 and furthermore 
under Utah law a Prescriptive Easement cannot be established for the purpose of storage of Personal 
Property on the real property of another. 
3. The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs established all of the elements for and hold a 
prescriptive easement to utilize the curved road to access Plaintiffs land but due to the fact that the 
sileage pit was not installed by Plaintiffs until 1983 Plaintiffs have not established a prescriptive 
easement over the same curved road for the purpose of accessing the sileage pit on the Plaintiffs land. 
4. Based on the Courts ruling on Boundary by acquiescence the Plaintiffs have not met 
their burden of Proof with respect to their Claim of Trespass. 
5. Prior to trial in this matter, the Court concluded that the Defendants counterclaims 
sounding in assault and in intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed. 
6. The Court now concludes that the Defendants have carried their burden of 
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proof with respect to their counterclaim for trespass. The parties entered into an oral stipulation in 
open court wherein they agreed found that LEE MCELPRANG had trespassed upon that if the Court 
and caused injury to the Defendants' land, that the following stipulation would apply. The Court has 
concluded that such a trespass has occurred and the Court adopts the Stipulation entered into by the 
parties as its remedy. The Stipulation is as follows: 
A. The parties' attorneys shall select a neutral third person to review and 
evaluate the restoration of Defendants' property in the WDP and the NDP to its original 
condition prior to November 1999. 
B. Unless a stay for appeal is issued, Counsel for the parties, no later than 
March 1, 2006 shall select (1) a date for Lee McElprang to begin the restoration 
described below, (2) a date for the restoration date to be completed, and (3) a date by 
which all the junk and personal property shall be removed from the NDA and the 
WDA. Counsel of the parties shall inform the Court of these dates by filing a written 
stipulation. The Jones property shall be restored to its original condition prior to 
November 1999 trespass as follows: 
1. Lee McElprang shall remove all personal property and junk of 
any kind whatsoever from both the NDA and the WDA 
2. Lee McElprang shall remove the culvert he caused to be 
installed in the ditch/canal located on the south end of the WDA 
3. Lee McElprang shall remove the road which he caused 
to be created from the culvert across the WDA to his property and he shall 
restore the land under same to its original condition prior to November 1999 , 
4. Lee McElprang shall restore the fence to its condition 
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prior to November 1999; 
C. Upon completion of the restoration by the McElprangs, the neutral 
third party shall inspect the restoration and either approve same or reject same 
as being a reasonable restoration. If the restoration is approved, then Plaintiffs 
shall be entitled to an entry of a Satisfaction of Judgment in this matter. If the 
restoration is not approved, then Plaintiffs shall have 10 days to bring the restoration up 
to standard of: the agreement shall be cancelled and one of the commercial 
contractors, namely Minchey Construction or Scamp Excavation, shall be 
brought in to finish the work and judgment for the reasonable costs of their work shall 
enter in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs herein. 
7. In the event that the Plaintiff does not perform the Stipulation outlined 
herein, the Court will retain ongoing jurisdiction to enter appropriate enforcement orders. 
8. Having fully reviewed the issue of attorney's fees following the Court's 
original ruling and having determined that there is not a statute or bad faith that would justify same, each 
party is ordered to pay their respective attorney's fees in this matter. 
9.. Defendants have prevailed on their trespass counterclaim and in 
obtaining dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims in this suit and, therefore are entitled to an award of 
their cost related to these claims pursuant to Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
10. Plaintiffs have prevailed obtaining dismissal of Defendants' 
counterclaims for assault and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
therefore are entitled to an award of their costs related to these claims pursuant to Rule 54 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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DATED this/fj* day of January, 2006. 
Judge BjSyce K. Bryner 
.<t£& SK**-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this fZ^ciay of January, 2006,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT, to: 
Joane Pappas White 
10 West Main St. 
Price, UT 84501 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000700105 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail J. CRAIG SMITH 
ATTORNEY PLA 
215 S STATE ST STE 650 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
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ATTORNEY DEF 
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Fax R. CHRISTOPHER PRESTON 
(801)413-1620 
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J. Craig Smith (4143) 
R. Christopher Preston (9195) 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE JONES and WILDA JONES, ; 
Counterclaimants, ] 
vs. 
LEE MCELPPANG and 
LORIE MCELPRANG, ; 
Counterdefendants. ] 
) JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 0007000105 
) Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for bench trial to the Court on June 24-27, 2003. 
The Court heard the sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses, received exhibits into evidence 
and took the matter under advisement pending the filing of written closing arguments. The Court 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs' Causes of Action sounding in boundary by acquiescence, prescriptive 
easements, estoppel, waiver and laches and trespass are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants' Causes of Action alleged in their Counter Claim with respect to 
assault and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. Judgment is hereby granted against the Plaintiffs,and each of them, and in favor 
AQ^Q -\r\in n~>\c X X P I A O n m 
FILED 
I ~ I 
JAN 1 7 2006 
[SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
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of the Defendants, and each of them, for the trespass and injury to the land committed by Plaintiff LEE 
MCELPRAMG against the Defendants' property: 
A. Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, it is 
ordered that the trespass shall be remedied as follows 
A. The parties' attorneys shall select a neutral third person to 
review and evaluate the restoration of Defendants' property in the WDP 
and the NDP to its original condition prior to November 1999. 
B. Counsel for the parties, no later than March 1, 2006 shall 
select (1) a date for Lee McElprang to begin the restoration described 
below, (2) a date for the restoration date to be completed, and (3) a date 
by which all the junk and personal property shall be removed from the 
NDA and the WDA. Counsel of the parties shall inform the Court of 
these dates by filing a written stipulation. The Jones property shall be 
restored to its original condition prior to November 1999 trespass as 
follows: 
1. Lee McElprang shall remove all personal property 
and junk of any kind whatsoever from both the NDA and the 
WDA 
2. Lee McElprang shall remove the culvert he 
caused to be installed in the ditch/canal located on the south end of 
the WDA 
3. Lee McElprang shall remove the road which he 
caused to be created from the culvert across the WDA to his 
property and he shall restore the land under same to its original 
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condition, prior to November 1999; 
4. Lee McElprang shall restore the fence to its 
condition prior to November 1999; 
C. Upon completion of the restoration by the McElprangs, 
the neutral third party shall inspect the restoration and either approve same or reject 
same as being a reasonable restoration. If restoration is approved, then Plaintiffs 
shall he entitled to an entry of a Satisfaction of Judgment in this matter. If the restoration is 
not approved, then Plaintiffs shall have 10 days to bring the restoration up to standard or the 
agreement shall be cancelled and one of the commercial contractors, namely M_nchey 
Construction or Scamp Excavation, shall be brought in to finish the work and judgment 
for the reasonable costs of their work shall enter in favor of the Defendants and 
against the Plaintiffs herein. 
B. In the event that Plaintiff LEE MCELPRANG does not complete the 
remedy as outlined within the Stipulation, this Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the 
Stipulation or award money damages in order to allow the Defendants' land to be 
restored back to its original condition prior to the injury inflicted by Plaintiff LEE 
MCELPRANG. 
4. Each party shall pay their respective attorney's fees in this matter. 
5. Defendants are awarded costs related to their trespass counterclaim and 
dismissal of Plaintiff s claims in an amount to be determined pursuant to rule 54 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. Plaintiffs are awarded costs related to the dismissal of Defendants 
assault and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress counterclaims in an 
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amount to be determined pursuant to rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED t h i s / ^ t day of January, 2006. 
~ ^ 
Judge/Bwce K. Bryner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Q£ day of January, 2006,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, to: 
Joane Pappas White 
10 West Main St. 
Price, UT 84501 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000700105 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail J. CRAIG SMITH 
ATTORNEY PLA 
215 S STATE ST STE 650 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail JOANE P WHITE 
ATTORNEY DEF 
10 W MAIN 
PO BOX 754 
PRICE UT 84501 
Fax R. CHRISTOPHER PRESTON 
(801)413-1620 
Dated this day of 201?^ 
/^usi/riu 
Court Clerk 
p^ap l (last) 
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